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FIVE STEPS TO RESPONSIBILITY
ElEna lisanyuk*
ABSTRACT
Responsibility has entered the academic discourse of logicians hardly more than few decades ago. 
I suggest a logical concept of responsibility which employs ideas both from a number of theories 
belonging to different branches of logic as well from other academic areas. As a comment to 
this concept, I suggest five steps narrative scenario in order to show how the logical dimension 
of responsibility emerges from diverse tendencies in logic and other sciences. Here are the five 
steps briefly stated:
Step 1. Developing modal formalisms capable of evaluative analysis of situations (deontic, 
epistemic and etc.).
Step 2. Drawing a conceptual borderline between normal and non-normal (weak) logical systems.
Step 3. Using different kinds of models.
Step 4. Agent- and action- friendly turn in logic.
Step 5. Creating formalisms for modeling different types of agency.
An idea advocated here within 5-Steps route to responsibility is that this concept is a complex 
causal and evaluative (axiological) relation. A logical account may be given for causal and 
normative aspects of this relation. Unfolding the responsibility back and forth through 5 Steps 
will result in different concepts. The technicalities are minimized for the sake of keeping the 
philosophical scope of the paper. For the same reason I also refrain from discussing legal and 
juridical ramifications of the issue.
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INTRODUCTION. BACK AND FORTH TO RESPONSIBILITY. 
The idea of responsibility originates in legal sources and 
grows out of legal notions of liability and accountability.1 Despite 
apparent conceptual closeness to each other the two legal notions 
mark an important borderline between deontological and causal 
approaches to responsibility. To say that agent α is accountable for 
some action or situation α in the face of agent β means that there 
is an asymmetric relation established between the two agents α 
and β in which α is the object of an obligation imposed on him 
by means of the accountability relation and β is the subject or 
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beneficiary to whom the corresponding power, right or privilege 
belongs. It is in respect to the relation accountability that we 
find pioneering instances of logical analysis of responsibility in 
J.Bentham2 in the XIX c. and W.N.Hohfeld3 in the beginning of 
XXc.4
Accountability is a kind of social relation between agents; 
it is usually elaborated in deontological terms and may be further 
applied to some particular actions and states. Contrary to this, 
liability relation takes such particular stance and develops the 
idea of causal connection between agent α and action or situation 
φ rather that of the accountability relation between agent α and 
agent β. It stresses the idea of agent`s being liable for something 
rather than agent`s being accountable to somebody.
In the view of the two faces of responsibility, liability 
and accountability, we may choose two different ways of how 
to pursue it: either we start with causal relations among agents, 
actions and facts and proceed then further to evaluate these 
causalities in deontic terms, or, alternatively, we do the other 
way round and begin with defining social relations among agents 
deontologically and then try to include also agents and actions 
into the picture. The two ways amount to the pair of back and 
forth routes through Steps 1-5. In philosophy, responsibility 
studies developed according to the both scenarios, and we 
may easily find deontological5 or ontic6 approaches to it that 
apparently point to the forward scenario, as well as functional7 
2 BENTHAM J. Of Laws in general. London, 1970.
3 HOHFELD W.N. Fundamental Legal Conceptions. Yale University Press, 1964 (orig. 
1923).
4 See substantial outline of both approaches in LINDAHL L. Position and change. 
5 KANT I. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Hrsg. von Joachim Kopper, Reclam, Stuttgart 
1961. See esp. B.1, Ch.1 §135.
6 INGARDEN R. Uber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente. Phillipp Reclam 
Jun., 1970.
7 HART H.L.A. Punishment and Responsibility. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968; Lenk, 
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or agent-wise8 positions which lean to the backward one. Perhaps, 
the imperative conception of responsibility advanced by H. 
Jonas is the only exception in this aspect, for it explicitly starts 
by pursuing causal issues and conceptual restrictions preventing 
human beings from getting the former totally controlled by 
means of science and proceeds further for the sake of stating the 
responsibility imperative on ethical grounds.9
In both routes of moving through Steps, there is a tension 
among certain groups of them which marks out the borderline 
between causal and evaluative aspect of responsibility relation. 
This tension forces those responsibility theorists who adopt the 
forward route to keep away from deepening into discussions of 
individual agents and personal responsibility, whereas those who 
adhere to the backward line are compelled to handle normative 
frameworks either as elements of general outer world eventual 
necessitations imposed on agents or as agent-dependent duties. In 
logic, responsibility studies start in S.Kanger who has advanced 
them in a manner which seems to be closer to the forward 
scenario.10 However, the backward way tends to become a 
mainstream approach for the contemporary logical considerations 
of responsibility. This is manifest in the conceptions of B.Kooi 
& A.Tamminga11 and especially of M.Mose Bentzen on which I 
mostly rely in my outline.
H. Macht und Machbarkeit der Technik. Stuttgart, 1994. S. 37 und v.
8 ARENDT H. Personal responsibility under dictatorship \\ Kohn J. (ed.) Responsibility 
and Judgement. Schocken Books, 2003 (1964). pp. 17-48.
9 JONAS H. Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik fur Technologische 
Zivilization. Frankfurt am Main: Surhkamp 1984. S.35-40.
10 KANGER S. Law and Logic\\ Holstrom-Hintikka G., Lindstrom S., Sliwinski R. (eds.) 
Collected papers of Stig Kanger with essays on his life and work. V. 1. Dordrecht, 
Kluwer, 2001. Pp. 146-169.
11 KOOI B., TAMMINGA A. Conflicting obligations in multi-agent deontic logic. \\ 
Goble L., Meyer J.-J.C. (eds.) DEON 2006, LNAI 4048, Springer Verlag, Berlin – 
Heidelberg, 2006. pp. 175-186. 
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Here I consider a backward view from Step 5 to Step 1, 
and place evaluative aspect of responsibility relation on top of 
its causal aspect which is often viewed in terms of determinism 
or indeterminism.
Despite the fact that Steps remain substantially the same 
in the route of defining responsibility relation by moving hither 
and thither, the resulting definitions are conceptually different. 
Let us have a brief look on why this is so.
ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY AND AGENTS. AROUND 
STEPS 4 AND 5.
The accountability relation is elaborated in the line of 
normative approaches in the framework of which the evaluative 
aspect of responsibility relation is investigated. Deontologically 
understood, responsibility relation may be outlined in a 
remarkable diversity of social or axiological terms with the help of 
which one can pursue legal obligations, moral postulates, socially 
rooted rules of conduct and personal duties. There is a great 
many of philosophers and legal theorists who explicitly point 
to the deontological character of social relations: Aristotle and 
Plato, St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, to mention just some 
of most influential ancient anticipators of the idea. Deontological 
character of social relations in a community is an important 
prerequisite for evaluative aspect of responsibility relation, for 
it informs us of two crucial issues regarding to this relation. One 
of them is that there are social facts that tend to be viewed in 
axiological or normative terms to somewhat larger extent than 
natural facts which seem to be less amenable in this sense. Another 
issue is that the distinction between natural and social facts is 
not impermeable, for in many aspects it is a matter of conceptual 
standpoint and philosophical justification. To put it otherwise, 
attributing values to certain kinds of facts and discriminating 
between social and natural facts are two conceptually different 
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endeavors.12 One can refrain from causal aspects as relative to 
natural facts and identify responsibility relation in deontological 
terms as a kind social relation between two agents. This way 
explores the accountability. In this case the study starts with Step 
1 and moves further up to Step 5. Step 1 with its deontic and 
epistemic logical frameworks will suffice to give a general formal 
view for such approach. This view abstracts from the distinction 
between action and situation based norms and demonstrates the 
accountability relation in terms of the stronger □-type modalities, 
such as obligations and prohibitions, whereas permission as the 
weaker ◊-type modality appears as logical dual for the stronger 
modalities. The best example for such approach is the standard 
deontic logic (SDL) of von Wright-type.13 In order to develop 
the idea of diverse kinds of the accountability relation such as 
right, obligation, privilege and etc. Step 3 provides us with game-
theoretical and dynamic frameworks.
Here I place evaluative aspect of responsibility relation 
which is usually outlined in axiological terms on top of its 
causal aspect which is normally viewed in terms of determinism 
or indeterminism. Consequently, responsibility is identified 
first as liability and this is outlined in causal terms which are 
ranged from eventual causation as the weakest up to guilt as the 
strongest. On the basis of this, actions and their results at question 
are then investigated in axiological terms as praiseworthy or 
blameworthy, and this manifests that such evaluation is always 
relative to certain normative order rooted in a social community. 
The idea to take the evaluative aspect of responsibility relation 
as distinct of its causal aspect constitutes a considerable part of 
Step 5. However, the idea to place the former on top the latter 
12 Cf. ALCHOURRON C.E., BULYGIN E. Normative knowledge and truth \\ 
Philosophical Analysis in Latin America \ eds. Gracia J.J. et al. Dordrecht, 198. Pp. 
25-45.
13  WRIGHT G.H.VON. Norm and Action. London, 1963.
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unveils the communicative character of responsibility relation 
when applied in the framework of social practices.
THE STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY RELATION. WHY 
THESE 5 STEPS?
Responsibility is a multi-sort complex relation among the 
following statements:
(0) that an action φ has in fact occurred;
(1) that there is an agent α who performed φ intentionally;
(2) that agent α has been able to perform φ;
(3) that φ performed by α is praiseworthy (blameworthy);
(4) that some obligations are imposed on α because of 
statements (1) – (3).
The statements (1)-(5) play different roles in defining 
responsibility relation. (0) implies either (1) or (2) or both 
and depending on that we arrive at the subsequent concepts 
of responsibility in terms of liability and guilt. On the basis of 
these, (3) is applied on top of the corresponding causal relation 
either as it is, and thus leads to a default kind of agent’s social 
responsibility which may described as absolute or moral duty, 
or, alternatively, it supports (4) and provides us with a variety of 
particular legal or moral obligations.
Now I briefly comment on these statements taken first 
separately and then in groups in order to show those groups of 
them for which a logical relation can be. In doing so, I aim to 
contrast the handful of logically accessible relations among the 
statements with two counterpart groups of the statements: those 
for which no logical notion may be given and those for which 
we are still awaiting for a logical model to be suggested.
To give a logical definition of a relation means to identify 
this relation in terms of logical consequence and truth values. Step 
1 suggests looking for a logical account of evaluative modalities 
and deontic logic seems to be an obvious candidate for this. 
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Instead, Step 5 advances focusing on actions and there types in 
regards with causal connections among event, action and agent. 
Statement (0) can easily be expressed by means of 
propositional variables. I will refer to it also as event-statement 
or fact-statement. Statements (1) and (2) are based on event-
statements, but operate over them in a special way. They are 
commented in the following two sections. Statements (3) and (4) 
presuppose that there exists a normative system which is used 
to evaluate the results of previously considered statements (1)-
(2). Consequently, in order to discuss statements (3)-(4) deontic 
modalities are introduced with the help of which different kinds 
of causal responsibility relations are then defined. 
ACTIONS AND STRATEGIC AGENCY. STEP 5 AND AROUND 
STEP 2.
Let us adopt basic J. Habermas-style distinction 
between two kinds of actions: strategic and communicative. 
Strategic actions are causal or can be viewed as causal, whereas 
communicative actions in many aspects exhibit dynamic 
nature in what concerns their basic objectives. In other words, 
communicative and creative actions have their ultimate objectives 
in the performing of an action itself and in most cases the 
objectives of such actions unfold in the course of the action. 
Contrary to that, strategic action is performed for the sake of its 
goal which can be identified is distinct from the action. Creative 
actions have dynamic character, for their objectives can undergo 
constitutive change while being performed. We may model 
strategic actions by means of utilitarian or consequentialist 
frameworks which have been fruitfully studied in game theory.14 
14 BENTZEN, M. MOSE. Stit, Iit, and Deontic Logic for Action Types. PhD Dissertation. 
Roskilde University, 2009; KOOI B., TAMMINGA A. Conflicting obligations in 
multi-agent deontic logic. \\ Goble L., Meyer J.-J.C. (eds.) DEON 2006, LNAI 4048, 
Springer Verlag, Berlin – Heidelberg, 2006. pp. 175-186.
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Such models form up Step 3 and are referred to here. However, 
communicative actions and creative agency are poorly amenable 
to being researched in terms of strategic action.
Strategic actions can be viewed as normal or non-
normal strategic actions. To say that agent α has performed a 
strategic action φ means that α has formulated a goal and gets 
it accomplished by performing φ. This kind of strategic action 
presupposes that agent α is both rational and reasonable. A person 
is regarded rational when he is able to outline a coherent line of 
behavior; we also call a rational person reasonable whenever he 
is assumed to be capable of means-ends considerations. Being 
rational and reasonable also implies agent’s free will which is 
a natural perquisite for strategic agency. Such free-will-based 
actions are called here normal strategic actions, or C-strategic 
actions. This is how normal strategic action are symbolized with 
the help of stit-frameworks15:
(C-strategic action) [α cstit ] φ
stit- operators are abbreviated from ‘sees to it that’ and 
describe the idea of strategic agency which is meant to include 
both cognitive planning and physical performance of action φ. 
Strategic planning can be interpreted in two philosophically 
distinct ways: in terms of freedom of will and in terms of both 
freedom of will and freedom of choice. Agent’s freedom of choice 
points to deliberative character of action whereas freedom of 
will is manifest of the agent being rational. Deliberative action is 
called non-normal strategic action here and is expressed by means 
of special dstit-operator which says what ‘agent α deliberatively 
sees to it that’ φ:
(D-strategic action) [α dstit ] φ
15 For, perhaps, the best account of stit-frameworks in deontic logic and references see 
HORTY J. Agency and Deontic Logic.
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Logical distinction between C- and D-strategic actions 
may be seen as parallel to philosophical distinction between acting 
according to freedom of will and that of freedom of will and 
freedom of choice altogether. The idea of distinguishing actions 
into normal and non-normal comes from the corresponding 
classification of modal systems in logic according to their 
inferential and semantic properties as expressed by the postulates 
the system at issue validates. In terms of modal systems C- 
strategic actions are viewed with help of S5-like normal modal 
system in which a number of important postulates hold. Let us 
briefly look at those pertinent to responsibility relation:
T [α cstit φ] ⊃ φ.
B. φ ⊃ [α cstit ¬[α cstit ¬φ]].
RE. ______φ ≡ ψ_______
[α cstit φ] ≡ [α cstit ψ]
N. [α cstit T],
Postulate T underlies the causal connection between 
agent’s α strategic behavior and the action φ performed. T 
-postulate may be also understood as effectiveness postulate. 
B-postulate insists on the agent’s freedom of will which provides 
the coherency of his strategic performance. J.Horty observes the 
importance of RE-postulate for responsibility studies, for it makes 
it perfectly clear that strategic agency is a kind of both cognitive 
and cause-related project, and for this reason, if two actions ψ 
and are φ identical, then agent α is regarded responsible for action 
ψ inasmuch as for action φ of which he may well be unaware of. 
N – postulate points to the necessary and consistent character 
of agent’s rational will, and taken together with B-postulate 
draws up the borderline between normal and non-normal 
strategic action, or C- and D-strategic actions, according to the 
symbolism employed. In case of deliberative strategic action N 
– and B-postulates do not hold. Instead, we have
N.  ¬[α cstit T].
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We will also need a weaker dual of strategic stit-operator 
in order to talk about allowing in the sense of weakly preserving 
a situation as is it or as it goes by itself:
(allowing) <α cstit φ> =Df ¬[α cstit ¬φ]
The third distinction over actions is that between positive 
and negative ones. This distinction enables us to distinguish acting 
from preventing or doing from refraining respectively.
On the basis of the latter two distinctions let us now 
see how causation, instrumental and strategic actions and 
their negative counterparts are expressed with the help of stit-
operators. Causation is expressed immediately by means of 
‘allowing’, for it is manifest of the eventual character of such 
agency when compared to the strategic character as expressed 
by the stronger stit-operators:
(allowing) <α cstit φ>
For example, because of the street dirt on his shoes a 
terrorist allows the floor to be muddy in the room where he holds 
the hostages. The terrorist purposed to hold the hostages and he 
did not intend to stain the floor, but eventually did the latter too. 
Another kind of action is an instrumental action. The 
account of  instrumental action rests on the idea of performing 
φ as means to accomplish ψ, provided the two are distinct from 
each other:
(instrumental action) [α cstit (φ ⊃ ψ)]
For example, a terrorist holds hostages men, women and 
children altogether in order to reserve a room for negotiation 
maneuver by means of releasing women and children when 
needed. He himself does organize neither negotiation nor a room 
for maneuver; instead, he performs the action of holding women 
and children to the effect of possible supporting the negotiation 
endeavor.
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The negative counterpart line for these kinds of actions 
consists of preventing and refraining. Let us identify preventing 
here and leave refraining to be dealt with in the next section.
Preventing is a deliberative strategic action, for it 
presupposes agent’s α awareness of both positive and negative 
scenarios for the action φ at question and secures him choosing 
the latter thus either refraining from the former or allowing it not 
to occur. This contention suggests that preventing is a non-normal 
strategic action and it should be symbolized with dstit-operator 
and not with stit-operator:
(preventing) [α dstit ¬φ]
As it becomes clear with this symbolism, preventing is 
just a kind of strategic action, but nevertheless it gets specially 
identified as exactly preventing because it conceptually marks out 
the distinction between positive and negative kind of strategic 
agency and does so not only at the propositional level, as both 
negative causation or instrumental action do. Consequently, 
the strategic character of preventing implies that that neither 
causation nor instrumental action may have their negative 
counterparts. Can we interpret preventing as C-strategic action? 
Perhaps, many theorists would reply positively, but I would rather 
go negative here and argue that negativeness at the action-level 
is something different from propositional negation.
Now we may conclude that both kinds of strategic 
action, normal and non-normal, are genuinely strategic, whereas 
causation and instrumental actions may be called quasi-strategic. 
Conceptually the distinction between allowing as the weakest 
instance of agentive action, instrumental action and both kinds 
of strategic action lies in the course of agentive intentions and 
abilities to which we now turn.16
16 During recent decades, intentions have been intensively and fruitfully studied in 
philosophy, logic and linguistics. For the two most influential approaches in logic 
see MEYER J.-J., VELTMAN F. Intelligent agents and common-sense reasoning. \\ 
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ABILITIES AND INTENTIONS. AROUND STEPS 2 AND 3.
Statement (2) has to do with two kinds of logical 
modalities: ability and intentions. Both kinds of modalities 
belong to formalisms developed in Step 4 and both of them are 
agent-friendly in the sense that they employ a notion of agent, 
though they do it in a different way. Apart from this, ability 
modal formalisms differ from that of intentions in two important 
aspects. One of them concerns the logical properties of the two, 
the other one has to do with the contemporary state of research 
at issue. Let us first take a glance at their logical properties.
Intensive study of ability modalities goes back to the last 
two decades of the XXc.17 and the results achieved in the course 
of it can be recapitulated in two basic lines. Parallel to what has 
been said above regarding C- and D- strategic actions, one can 
think of abilities as of kinds of □-like and ◊- like modalities in 
the sense described by K-system which is the weakest of normal 
modal systems. Alternatively, one can interpret abilities as non-
normal irreflexive modalities and thus take them in the sense 
of E-system or yet weaker ones. In both cases abilities may be 
formally modeled by means of possible world’s structures where 
actions are matched with their outcomes. Moving in this way we 
get □-like strong and ◊- like weak ability modalities by minimal 
and maximal amount of matches correspondingly. Another way 
of introducing ability modalities employs stit-frameworks. 
Stronger A - ability is understood as ‘agent α will see to 
it that’ φ:
(will-ability)  A[α cstit] φ
BLACKBURN P., VAN BENTHEM J., WOLTER F. (eds.) Handbook of Modal Logic. 
Elsevier, 2007. Pp. 991-1029 and RAO, A.S., GEORGEFF M.P. Modelling rational 
agents within a bdi-architecture \\ HUHNS M.N., SINGH M.P. (eds) Readings in 
Agents. Morgan Kaufmann, 1994. Pp. 317-328.
17 See HORTY J. Agency and Deontic Logic. Oxford UP, pp. 2-24.
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Weaker E - ability is taken to say what ‘agent α might see 
to it that’ φ: 
(might-ability)  E[α cstit] φ
Intention modality is a modality of a different sort than 
that of abilities. Agent’s intention to do something is closely 
related to his cognitively understood intellectual abilities and his 
freedom of will. In order to formulate an intention for action 
agent has to create a strategic outline of the intended action 
thus choosing18 a line of behavior out of those available to him 
according to the action outline.
Then, on the basis of the choice he has to evaluate the 
possible outcomes of the action according to different scenarios 
of performing it. Finally, he has to pick out the scenarios with 
the best outcomes as regards to the intended goal. Briefly stated, 
intention is the last stage of this agent’s action strategic preview 
and it is a function over the agent’s choices; intention function 
merges the agentive choices with the best outcomes and is 
normally modeled with the help of utilitarian frameworks. Any 
strategic action implies that it is intended action, but the contrary 
does not hold. Agent may have intentions which are waiting to 
be realized as well as those that are never realized:
[α cstit ] φ ⊃ [α iit ] φ
[α dstit ] φ ⊃ [α iit ] φ
iit -operator is a normal D45 operator and it validates 
standard normality postulates.
Now we are equipped enough as to consider refraining of 
which there exists two versions parallel to the distinction between 
normal and non-normal strategic actions.
(C-refraining)  E [α cstit φ] ∧ <α cstit ¬φ>
18  This notion of choice in what concerns intention is not to be confused with term 
‘choice’ in ‘freedom of choice’. 
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(D- refraining)  E [α dstit φ] ∧ ¬ [α cstit φ].
Crucial aspect in distinguishing normal C-refraining from 
non-normal D-refraining is the agent’s freedom of choice. In 
both cases agent α might have done φ in the respective strategic 
way. However, in case of D-refraining agent α not only declines 
performing φ, but also shows no preference or care in what 
regards both occurring and non-occurring of φ thus ipso facto 
allowing either of the two to happen. Unlike this, C-refraining 
suggests that agent α knowingly allows happening exactly ¬φ 
but not the contrary. Leibniz’s Fatum Mahometanum and Fatum 
Stoicum are suitable examples of these kinds of refraining,19 
respectively, though, perhaps, in Leibniz’s version the abilities 
should refer rather to God than to the agent. 
MODELS FOR ACTIONS. STEP 3.
In modeling diverse entities like facts, actions, intentions, 
agency and etc., logicians widely use different frameworks 
aiming to grasp their formal properties by means of ascribing 
semantic values to entities analysed. Models provide abstract 
patterns of real world viewed from a certain angle and in this 
way supply inferential formalisms with the systems of logical 
values. Selecting particular model for defining a logical relation 
between some speculative entities constitutes a substantial part 
of logical heuristics and creativity.
There is a number of mainstream types of such models, for 
instance, possible worlds style or game-theoretical style, to recall 
just two most influential. Possible worlds, or model theoretical 
semantics appear in two basic versions: standard relativistic 
which fits relatively well with normal modal systems closed under 
logical consequence, and neighborhood frameworks which are 
specially designed to express their weaker formal properties such 
19 LEIBNIZ G.W.F. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, 
and the Origin of Evil. Open Court Publishing, 1985. P.43.
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as closedness under equivalence instead of that of consequence, 
among others.20
Responsibility of an agent is a relation sensitive not only 
to the formal properties of connections between facts, actions and 
agents, which can be modeled in game-theoretical style,21  but also 
to the effectiveness of agent’s activities. In the view of imposing on 
agents some obligations resulting from agents’ previous actions, 
the outcomes hit in fact have to be estimated in their relation to 
the range of possible outcomes of the action at issue. This can 
be done in two ways, by calculating probabilities or utilities, and 
either of the two can be outlined in relation to two core elements 
of action, in agent-wise or event-wise perspective. It is worth 
observing here that adopting either of the two perspectives is far 
from being a matter of philosophical taste, for it will provide us 
with different conclusions regarding investigating responsibility. 
Agent-wise perspective proceeds backwards along the Steps, 
but event-wise perspective takes the evaluative vein and moves 
forward from Step 1 to Step 5.
In calculating probabilities or utilities, outcomes of 
agentive actions play crucial role. By means of intentions agent 
picks out a number of best outcomes in the line of behavior he 
has chosen before out of those available to him. Consequently, 
we have to differentiate the measure of his responsibility in 
case he achieves his best outcome, his second best and etc. 
best one, or fails to hit any of them. This is done by means of 
employing utility or consequentialist models which evaluate the 
outcomes. In the view of these game theory inspired  approaches 
we distinguish agent’s α responsibility for performing φ from 
20 For the substantial exposition of these kinds of logical models see CHELLAS B. Modal 
Logic. An Introduction. Cambridge 1980., GABBAY D. Investigation in Modal and 
Tense Logic with Application to Problems in Philosophy and Linguistics. Dordrecht, 
1976.
21 Cf. HINTIKKA, JAAKKO AND GABRIEL SANDU. “Game-theoretical semantics,” 
in JOHAN VAN BENTHEM AND ALICE TER MEULEN (eds.), Handbook of Logic 
and Language, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997. pp. 361–410.
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attempting φ or risking φ respectively. For example, Hero succeeds 
in releasing most of the hostages kept by Terrorist, but some of 
the hostages die. We say that Hero is causally responsible for 
risking those hostages’ lives which have been lost dead as well as 
for attempting to save all the hostages alive. Depending on how 
the circumstances are evaluated in causal terms we also may say 
that Terrorist is guilty of attempt of killing the hostages, whereas 
Hero is liable for the deaths of some of the hostages. Let us put 
these notions in more exact terms.
CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY. STATEMENTS (1) AND (2).
The distinctions drawn among the kinds of actions 
provide us with a firmer ground for formulating of a number 
of notions of causal responsibility.22 We call agent α positively 
responsible for φ [α dstit] φ, if φ has been performed by agent 
α, or simply – there is event φ, and φ has been a deliberative 
strategic action of α.
(positively responsible) φ ∧ [α dstit] φ
Being positively responsible φ implies that agent performed 
the action to the effect that hits minimal best or minimal positive 
outcome.
Why D-strategic action and not altogether C- and 
D-strategic actions matter regarding agent positively responsible? 
The answer is that to say that somebody is responsible is to make 
a statement of type (3). For this reason, it is worth considering 
the issue of agent’s freedom to act and outlining the question of 
agentive freedom in agent-wise manner which amounts to seeing 
the agent acting on the basis of either free will or free will and 
free choice altogether. Demonstrating the latter, for instance, by 
means of pointing to the fact that there had been an alternative 
22  See MOSE BENTZEN. OP.CIT. P. 42-45.
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choice for the agent would already suffice to prove the strategic 
and free character of the agency at issue. Justifying agent’s relying 
on free will only seems to be a far more sophisticated endeavor. 
The question of agent’s positive responsibility is the point where 
the communicative aspect of imposing responsibility originates.23 
Agent α is liable for φ if φ has actually happened, the agent 
had been able to prevent φ, but he didn’t:
(liable) φ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ
This symbolism provides us with a notion of liability 
in a weak or minimal sense as regards to causal connections 
between the agent, his action and the fact. This is the case when 
agent did not intent for φ, but at the same time he did nothing to 
prevent φ despite his being able to. To continue the Hero-Terrorist 
example, Hero is liable for the hostages lost dead, for he could 
have foreseen some of Terrorist’s tactics, say, that Terrorist would 
keep the hostages in two groups located in two separate places, 
but Hero did not.
The notion of being liable for risking expresses a 
somewhat stronger causal connection among the three elements:
(liable for risking) ¬φ ∧ <α cstit φ> ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ
Liability for risking is a typical case when φ did not 
happen, but still the agent could have made both φ and ¬φ, 
depending on his choice of the respective line of conduct. Thus, 
the agent did not enhance ¬φ, but could have prevented it. In the 
above example Hero is apparently liable for risking the hostages’ 
lives.
On order to say that an agent is guilty for something we 
have to consider agentive intentions in regards to the action and 
its effect at issue. Common sense considerations prompt that 
23  See LISANYUK E. Responsibility, rationality and power. In DOUDNIK S.I., OSIPOV 
I.D. (eds) Constitutional state and individual responsibility. St Petersburg: St Petersburg 
Philosophical Society, 2011. Pp. 61-77. (In Russian).
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being guilty for φ means being responsible for φ and intended 
to do φ. Agent’s being positively responsible for φ implies his 
being intended to do φ, as it has been observed above. We also 
say that being positively responsible is a necessary condition for 
being guilty. An agent α is guilty for φ, if he is liable for φ and 
he intended to do φ:
(positively guilty) φ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ ∧ [α iit] φ
This symbolism provides us with the notion of an agent’s 
positive guilt for conscious doing something. In order to construct 
a negative counterpart notion of agentive guilt we now combine 
the notion of agentive liability for risking in which the effect of 
the action at issue shows up with a negative outcome with the 
agent’s intention. This is how we arrive at the notion of being 
guilty for attempt:
(guilty of attempt) ¬φ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ ∧ [α iit] φ ∧ <α 
cstit φ>
In our example Terrorist is apparently guilty of attempt 
as regards to the hostages’ death, for he has intended to hold 
them what could have lead him to killing them. Alternatively, 
had not Hero saved some of the hostages they may have been 
all lost dead because of Terrorist’s intention and action which 
both allowed them all being lost.
In order to sum up the section about the kinds of causal 
responsibility, let us observe two important issues. We measure 
causal engagement of an agent in the event produced by means 
of distinguishing two lines of analysis. One concerns agentive 
reasons to act, from allowing up to strategic performing with 
the help of abilities and intentions. The other one is about the 
effectiveness of the agent’s activities which is outlined on the basis 
of formal frameworks for modeling situations, actions, agentive 
choices and outcomes. Combining the two lines provides us with 
either probabilistic, or utilitarian, or yet two-dimensional picture 
of cognitive and causal aspects of agency. However, despite the 
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fact that we call agents liable, responsible or guilty in relation to 
this picture, we have established analytic idea of responsibility 
only, without evaluating agent’s causal and cognitive behavior 
in axiological terms. In order to do so there should be a system 
of corresponding values.
DEONTIC LOGIC IN AGENT-WISE PERSPECTIVE. STEP 1.
The idea to study normative aspects of human behavior 
originates in antiquity and continues in two lines which here have 
been called causal and evaluative. Up to recent decades the latter 
stance has been far more investigated. Its most influential and 
well explored contributors are Leibniz to whom we owe the idea 
of deontic-alethic parallelism, J.Bentham whose accountability 
analysis is often called Bentham tradition in logic as distinct from 
that of Leibniz’s, and last but not least is G.von Wright whose 
pioneering contribution to the evaluative line launches its rapid 
and fruitful development in the direction of pursuing logic of 
norms and normative systems.24
In Leibniz-von Wright line of deontic logic norms are 
expressed with the help of deontic characters O – obligations, F 
– prohibitions and P – permission by means of applying them to 
norms’ contents expressed by propositional variables. So we get 
Oφ, Fφ and Pφ, as obligation to do φ, obligation to refrain from 
doing φ and permission to perform φ respectively. This is how 
absolute deontic logic starts and continues further to identify the 
logical relations among norms or sentences expressing them. In 
its dyadic or relative version deontic logic also takes agents and 
situations as correlates for norms’ applications.
The conception of norm underlying the development of 
deontic logic in this perspective advances norms as situation-
24 For a concise overview of the contemporary state of deontic logic MCNAMARA P. 
Deontic Logic. In: ZALTA P. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. 2011.
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related prescriptions and views them in an objectivistic way. 
Norms understood in this way provide individual agents with 
absolute or relative objectives for their social conduct and these 
norms may be further reformulated as rules applying to certain 
situations.25 Agents are seen as ultimate norms’ addressees to 
whom the norms are directed and whose social behavior they 
are meant to govern.
Alternative way to talk about norms is to view them as 
agent-wise regulations in the sense that norms are taken not 
only to govern agents’ action but also are necessarily constituted 
by agents. According to that, norms are considered in an 
indeterministic way and are viewed as part of outer world in 
which the agent chooses his line of behavior. Perhaps, the first 
agent-wise perspective for studying norms has been advanced by 
J.Bentham, but conceptually this tradition starts in a somewhat 
confused contribution of E.Mally, who has introduced his ill-
formed logical system called Deontik in 1926.26 There two 
contemporary versions of agent-wise indeterministic tradition of 
deontic logic. One has Scandinavian origin and its landmarks are 
contributions by S.Kanger, L.Lindahl and K.Segerberg; another 
owes much to N.Belnap and J.Horty and has been inspired by 
temporal logic of A.Prior. stit-operators introduced above belong 
to the latter version.
According to the agent-wise idea of deontic logic deontic 
operators may be viewed as norm imposing functions over 
agent’s choices. There are several ways how such function can 
be introduced depending on the formal framework which is 
employed at issue. Here we will rely on the utilitarian framework 
suggested by M.Mose Bentzen, but take it in a less cumbersome 
way. He defines such agent-wise norms as certain optimal 
25 Perhaps, the best example of such scholarly application may be found in 
ALCHOURRON C.E., BULYGIN E. Normative systems.
26 LISANYUK E. Deontic ‘cocktail’ according to E.Mally’s receipt. In: Logical 
Investigations 19 (2013). Moscow-St Petersburg, 2013 P.5-27.
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strategies formulated and picked out by the agent for the sake of 
arriving at the best available outcome. It is clear that agent-wise 
norms are genuinely individual, for they originate in the agent’ 
free will and do so due to agent’s rational choice to obey or 
disobey them. The conceptual idea behind the agent-wise norm 
is that norms effectively regulate human social practice just in 
case the humans as ultimate norms addressee regard them as 
necessary constraints for themselves.27
Here I use term ‘duty’ to refer to agent-wise □-type positive 
norm and contrast it with term obligation to which standard 
deontic O-operator corresponds. 
(agentive duty) Shall [α cstit] φ
Shall – operator is a normal modal operator over actions 
(ought-to-do operator) which validates K and some other 
normality postulates.
In conclusion to this brief story of how different 
approaches to deontic study of norms emerge, it is worth 
observing that the idea of a conception of norm that would be 
capable of giving a descriptive account of how agent actually 
behave in the view of diverse normative systems existing as a 
part of the social reality, has been to some extent anticipated in 
the paraconsistent approach to normative systems.28
RESPONSIBILITY EVALUATED. CONTINUING WITH STEP 1.
Let us now impose some evaluations onto the ideas of 
causal responsibility with the help of the deontic operators. An 
27 LISANYUK E., ANTONOV M. Deontic logic and the theory of normative systems. 
A foreword. In: Lisanyuk E. (ed) ‘‘Normative systems’ and other works in legal 
philosophy and logic of norms. St Petersburg Univ.Press, St Petersburg, 2013. P. 4-53. 
(In Russian).
28  PUGA, L. Z.; DA COSTA, N. C. A., VERNENGO, R. J. Normative logics, 
morality and law. Experts systems in law. A. Martino (ed.). Elsevier Sc. 
Pv., 1992.
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agent is regarded blameworthy of φ, if he is guilty of φ and his 
duty was to prevent φ:
(blameworthiness and guilt) φ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ ∧ [α iit] φ 
∧ Shall [α cstit] φ
An agent is blameworthy of attempt to φ, if in fact φ did 
not happen, but the agent intended to φ and allowed φ to happen 
despite his duty to prevent it:
(blameworthiness for attempt) ¬φ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ ∧ 
[α iit] φ ∧ <α cstit φ> ∧ Shall [α cstit] φ
Yet weaker blame on an agent is that of neglect causation, 
when φ occurs, but the agent had no intention to φ, however his 
duty was to prevent it and he could have done so:
(blameworthiness of neglect) φ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ ∧ ¬ [α iit] 
φ ∧ Shall [α cstit] ¬φ
A blame of risking is imposed on an agent, if φ actually did 
not happen, but it might have happened should the agent have 
made another choice. At the same time the agent did not intend 
it that φ, but his duty was to prevent φ and he was able to do so:
(blameworthiness of risk) ¬φ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ ∧ ¬ [α iit] 
φ ∧ Shall [α cstit] ¬φ
It is quite easy to find legal notions of culpability 
corresponding to these of blameworthiness. Let us now observe 
that all notions of blameworthiness are relative to agentive 
duties. Blameworthiness may be also introduced on the basis of 
obligations and it is precisely the way how it is being done in many 
cases. However, viewing blameworthiness in this deterministic 
perspective inevitably leads us to lean towards evaluative stance 
according to which not only evaluative aspects of responsibility 
are imposed but the causal ones are also seen as imposed rather 
than investigated.
Contrary to blameworthiness, praiseworthiness may be 
both duty- and obligation-relative.
(positive praiseworthiness) φ ∧ [α cstit] φ ∧ Shall [α cstit] φ
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(negative praiseworthiness) Oφ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ ∧ [α iit] 
φ ∧ <α cstit φ>
The idea of being negatively praiseworthy suggests that 
in cases when there is an obligation to do φ, but in fact φ did not 
happen, this not occurring of φ comes as a result of other causes 
and not as a result of the agent’ actions who actually intended to 
φ. Negative praiseworthiness may have many faces depending on 
how duties and obligations are sorted out at issue by an agent. 
For example, obeying an obligation may be viewed as omissible 
by the agent for some reason, but he nevertheless stays loyal to 
the obligation instead of active refrain from obeying it. Negative 
praiseworthiness may be summarized as that of attempt by means 
of the above introduced notion of liability of risking:
(praiseworthiness of attempt)  Oφ ∧ E [α dstit] ¬φ
The notions of negative praiseworthiness give us a notable 
chance to see how obligations go across and even incompatible 
with duties and in what causal and evaluative terms this quite 
familiar everyday instance can be pursued. Another remarkable 
issue about both praiseworthiness and blameworthiness is that 
adding them on top of the causal determination of actions 
provides us with a normatively evaluated responsibility relation 
but gives it in a descriptive way. This is the result available at the 
backward route to responsibility and unavailable at the forward 
route where it always shows up as normative.
CONCLUSION
The 5-step concept of responsibility is a kind of logical 
high-tech endeavor, for it employs a number of notions and 
means from different areas. It has been demonstrated here 
that depending of the forward or, alternatively, the backward 
route through these 5 Steps one arrives at different concepts of 
responsibility. The backward scenario considered here provides 
the descriptive concept in which normative evaluation appears 
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on top of the causal investigation. The logical concept of 
responsibility outlined here applies to strategic agency and leaves 
out that of communicative and creative.
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